

# **Co-operation by Design: Initiating a Framework for the Auckland Arts Sector**

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**A dissertation submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of  
Bachelor of Arts (Hons) in Political Studies, University of Auckland, 2010**

## **Declaration**

I declare that, to the best of my knowledge and belief and in accordance with the policies of the University of Auckland, this dissertation is my own work, all sources have been properly acknowledged to the full extent of my indebtedness, and the assignment contains no plagiarism. I further declare that I have not previously submitted this work or any version of it for assessment in any other Department or Faculty or for any award offered by the University of Auckland, its partner institutions, or any other institution. I further declare that I understand the plagiarism policy of the University of Auckland and the Department of Political Studies, including the penalties for which I am liable should my work be found to contain plagiarised material.

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## **Abstract**

This research makes an argument for the importance of groups to the level of civic engagement in a modern democracy. It proceeds from the assumption that groups need to be designed in order to form and to continue to operate effectively. It then goes on to build a framework for that formation which addresses elements that constitute a group: incentives, structure, common interest, leadership, and membership. These elements often involve a technological component in their practical implementation. The analysis is informed by theories of co-operation, group formation (both hierarchies and networks), and interest groups, which have examined the nature of various modes of organisation in society. The analysis produces a model of an advocacy coalition for the case study, that of the Auckland arts sector.

# Acknowledgements

Sincere and warm thanks to Michael Mintrom for his supervision, support and his special brand of ‘minspiration’.

Linda Blincko from The Depot Artspace, for planting the seed of interest that grew into this project and helping me to understand what issues were most pressing to the arts sector at this time.

James McCarthy from Te Tuhi Centre for the Arts, for informing the research through his experience in the sector and sharing his knowledge, resources, time and enthusiasm.

Julia Adams for her thoughtful and diligent proofing of this work, and her support through many other projects.

My mother, Julie Franklin, for her support of many facets of my life’s education.

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# INTRODUCTION

As the founder of group theory Arthur Bentley once said, ‘There is no group without its interest.’<sup>1</sup> However, this does not necessarily mean that every group can be characterised as an ‘interest group’. Many different labels have been used by political, sociological and economic theorists to describe group structures. Labels such as community, organisation, association, network, hierarchy, firm, and coalition have all been distinguished from each other on sometimes subtle, and often significant, grounds. This research will select and synthesise the strongest and most effective qualities from these different types of groups in order to develop a framework for group interaction that best serves the audience it is directed at, the Auckland arts sector. It could be argued that changes in the nature of groups can also be attributed to the arrival of new technologies and institutions, which reshape the relationships between members of society. It is therefore important to revise these terms and the concepts associated with them as our understanding of society develops. By examining a diverse range of titles and the distinctions between them, this research aims to identify an appropriate label for the group structure it develops. It will look widely across disciplines – beyond group-formation theories in the social sciences and into business and management studies around organisations and firms. These theorists have borrowed much from the social sciences to begin with, but have made some interesting extensions – some of these developments can be borrowed back and made useful to non-commercial groups in society. Finally, the research will connect this model structure with findings about the importance of groups to democracy, and the role of government in fostering groups and the conditions which sustain them in order to fulfil its democratic responsibilities.

The peculiarities of the Auckland case study are assessed in a brief scoping of the city and its arts sector. The research begins by couching its approach in theories which present solutions for problems of collective action. This is related to the work of political game theorists such as Robert Axelrod’s study of co-operation

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<sup>1</sup> Mancur Olson, *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965), 8.

between individuals. It then goes on to examine how these responses have been incorporated into theories of institution and organisation design. Mancur Olson outlines mechanisms of incentives and coercion for inducing co-operation and solving problems of collective action, which can be compared with Axelrod's suggestion to alter the payoffs for individuals. These approaches are in contrast to traditional approaches espoused by communitarian theorists, who place more emphasis on community values as opposed to organisational mechanisms. From this grounding, the research develops a methodology for designing a framework for co-operation within the sector. The approach borrows relevant elements from a range of group theorists and modifies them through a process of comparison and analysis, before applying the findings to the case study to produce an advocacy coalition model for the Auckland arts sector. A discussion examines the significance of these findings to democracy, connects this with the concept of social capital, and introduces the values of collaborative governance. This research provides an argument for the need to design co-operation within groups in society, and identifies the implications of group theory for wider democratic theory. It also suggests how technology, specifically the internet, can play a role in assisting groups and government to meet these new demands and establish new co-operative structures and processes.

## **SECTION I – CONTEXT**

### **Introducing the Case Study of Auckland**

With rapid urban growth occurring globally, cities have become a vital site for analysis; many have argued that the future of human society lies in the growth of the city.<sup>2</sup> Cities provide a useful context to examine the dynamics of communities – such a setting offers communities many opportunities, particularly because a greater diversity of individuals are brought together.<sup>3</sup> The governance of cities is evolving

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<sup>2</sup> Adrian Little, *The Politics of Community* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2002), 18.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, 67.

along with these changes, becoming as deserving of attention as national levels of governance. Local governments can claim a high level of legitimacy in that they are arguably closer to individuals and can therefore represent specific identities and engage at a grass-roots level with citizens.<sup>4</sup> Due to this growth in size and efficacy, cities are increasingly dissatisfied at operating through central government control, and seek to represent themselves at an international level and pursue their own agendas.<sup>5</sup> The region of Auckland has expressed such a sentiment through its goals of achieving greater international recognition and a ‘world-class city’ status.<sup>6</sup> Auckland is an interesting case to study at the present time, as it is undergoing unprecedented changes in its local governance structure. In November 2010, the eight city, district and regional councils that make up the Auckland region were amalgamated into one council with one mayor, who is responsible for making policy decisions for the entire region.<sup>7</sup> This has the potential to impact on the standing arrangements, funding and relationships of organisations, industries, and individuals within the region.

One sector that has already expressed concern about this is the arts sector. Indications by authority figures involved in the restructuring have suggested that there will be a ‘stripping back’ of local government funding to ‘core services’, essentially excluding the arts.<sup>8</sup> Some members of the sector have come together in a series of informal meetings to discuss their concerns about the council restructuring.<sup>9</sup> These meetings were the first occasion of wide-spread interaction in the sector in a long time; where members from across the sector co-ordinated with each other, linked by a common concern. Due to the impending changes being of regional significance, the impact is uniquely relevant to the arts across its sub-sectors. The

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<sup>4</sup> Felix Stalder, *Manuel Castells: The Theory of the Network Society* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2006), 123.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid.

<sup>6</sup> New Zealand, Royal Commission on Auckland Governance. *Report. Volume 3, Summary of Submissions* (Wellington: New Zealand Government, 2009), 9.

<sup>7</sup> New Zealand. *Making Auckland Greater: The Government’s Decisions on Auckland Governance* (Wellington: New Zealand Government, 2009), 7.

<sup>8</sup> Claire Trevett, "Hide Plans Radical Shakeup of Councils," *New Zealand Herald*, June 9, 2009.

<sup>9</sup> “Arts and the Auckland Supercity”, public meeting held at TAPAC, Auckland, September 1, 2009.

novelty of this situation has produced some unexpected obstacles for the sector that it needs to address before it can begin to solve issues collectively related to council restructuring – crucially, the sector’s inability to co-ordinate efficiently and effectively within its membership. The arts sector in Auckland has no formal structures to guide its internal communication and aid interaction. While the restructuring of local government poses risks to the sector, it also represents an opportunity for the sector to develop a sense of cohesive identity through co-operation. This research aims to assist that development by designing a structure so that the sector can achieve its common goal of influencing local government and turn potential pitfalls into advantages.

The arts sector in this case can be considered to include all individual arts practitioners, as well as organisations, public service providers, community groups, arts education institutions, and commercial enterprises and industries. The ‘arts’ as a term has been defined through related theory and policy both narrowly, confined to areas like the visual arts, and broadly, to include all types of creative activity – occasionally going even so far as to include science and technology.<sup>10</sup> This analysis uses the term in a broad sense, allowing for individuals to identify themselves as belonging to the sector at will, but limits this understanding to the more commonly held view of the arts which excludes scientific areas of creativity.

### **Collective Action Problems and Co-operation by Design**

Political scientist David Truman argues that looking at the interaction of groups is the only way to truly understand politics.<sup>11</sup> Many theorists have advocated similar views, which look at the ubiquity of groups in society and the fundamental propensity of humans to form and join associations.<sup>12</sup> By looking at how individuals are organised within society and how those groups themselves interact with each other, it can be argued that we can reach greater understanding about how political agendas are established and influenced, and how collective goods are obtained by those who seek them. With the rate of party membership declining in New Zealand,

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<sup>10</sup> Richard Florida, "Cities and the Creative Class," *City and Community* 2, no. 1 (2003): 4.

<sup>11</sup> David B. Truman, *The Governmental Process; Political Interests and Public Opinion* (New York: Knopf, 1951), 23.

<sup>12</sup> Olson, *op. cit.*, 112.

and groups such as the Forest and Bird Society boasting a bigger membership than political parties,<sup>13</sup> it seems pertinent to examine the formation and political purpose of groups which are organised around interests and common goals. This is a different approach to past study, which has placed much focus on groups of an explicit political affiliation or a common geographical location. Traditional group theory, or pluralism, assumes that groups will form and attract members when a need arises in society for them to do so.<sup>14</sup> Truman's 'disturbance theory' expands on this and causally connects events which threaten the political or economic interests of individuals with the organisation of individuals into groups to collectively contest and rectify such changes.<sup>15</sup> In examining 'co-operation by design', this research takes a different perspective, based on the work of theorists of community formation and organisational change, who advocate the active manufacturing of co-operative environments.

Adrian Little, in his work looking at traditional and radical communitarian perspectives of groups in society, emphasises the need for the development of strategies for the practical enactment of community formation.<sup>16</sup> He suggests that this is best done by assessing the social and economic structure of the environment in which communities exist and altering the institutional framework to accommodate them.<sup>17</sup> Little argues that the capacity of communities to form and to maintain their activities is heavily influenced by these factors. At the same time, he cautions that arrangements of communities cannot be imposed on their membership; individuals must want to co-operate and must be able to understand the nature of the relationships between them.<sup>18</sup> To disprove the pluralist position, Mancur Olson points to groups in society who, despite their needs, are not actually organised.<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>13</sup> Forest and Bird claims a membership of 40,000 people nationally, see: Forest and Bird, "Membership," <http://www.forestandbird.org.nz/support-us/membership> (accessed August 5, 2010). New Zealand's largest political party, The Maori Party, is estimated to have over 17,000 members see: Teresa O'Connor, "Maori Party 'Biggest in the Country'," *The Herald on Sunday*, May 29, 2005.

<sup>14</sup> Olson, op. cit., 112.

<sup>15</sup> Truman, op.cit., 31.

<sup>16</sup> Little, op. cit., 8.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, 144.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, 131.

<sup>19</sup> Olson, op. cit., 132.

Gary Miller affirms this proposition, stating that nothing is inevitable about the emergence of co-operation in any given organisational setting.<sup>20</sup> Olson's argument is based on the assertion that even though it is in the rational interest of individuals to co-operate, and they agree on the common goal of the group, they will not co-operate in the absence of some kind of coercion or incentive.<sup>21</sup> Olson quotes Max Weber who identifies the continual failure throughout history of purely ideological motives to 'bring forth the continuing effort of large masses of people'.<sup>22</sup> He argues instead that performance in society is directly proportional to the rewards and sanctions offered.<sup>23</sup>

These issues of co-ordination and group formation can be characterised as problems of collective action, which some theorists claim is the basis for all political activity.<sup>24</sup> These problems arise when goals or outcomes cannot be achieved by individuals acting alone and require co-ordination with others to be solved. Such common goals are also referred to as collective or public goods, which by their nature benefit the entire group once attained, whether or not they have co-operated or contributed to the activity to get it.<sup>25</sup> This is where problems develop in deterring free-riders and convincing members of the group to participate. A commonly used example of this is the 'prisoner's dilemma' where individuals, in following their rational self-interest, end up worse off than if they had co-operated with each other.<sup>26</sup> In answer to such a dilemma, Robert Axelrod has developed a game theory approach which seeks to discover the ideal conditions under which co-operation might emerge without the interference of a central authority.<sup>27</sup> He discovered that a tit-for-tat strategy yielded the best results for a player over the course of an entire tournament.

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<sup>20</sup> Gary J. Miller, "Managerial Dilemmas: Political Leadership in Hierarchies," in *The Limits of Rationality*, eds. Karen Schweers Cook and Margaret Levi (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), 340.

<sup>21</sup> Olson, op. cit., 1-2.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid., 13.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid.

<sup>24</sup> Jon Elster, "When Rationality Fails," in *The Limits of Rationality*, eds. Karen Schweers Cook and Margaret Levi (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), 224.

<sup>25</sup> Olson, op. cit., 15.

<sup>26</sup> Robert M. Axelrod, *The Evolution of Cooperation* (London: Penguin, 1990), 9.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid., 3.

This is where a player starts off by co-operating with the other player and from then on is guided by a principle of reciprocity – returning either co-operation or defection based on the other player’s move.<sup>28</sup> Axelrod seeks to reformulate interactions between individuals by shifting the foundational perception for this interaction from one which commonly assumes a zero-sum perspective, to one in which all players can viably do well.<sup>29</sup> Tit-for-tat demonstrates the possibility of a non-zero-sum game; the player using such a strategy ends up better off by eliciting the other player’s co-operation, not by defeating them.<sup>30</sup>

While the narrowness of an experiment like Axelrod’s is risky in that it limits potential application to scenarios such as those that were carried out in the tournament – a two-player challenge of computer algorithms – it has established some important principles that could guide work around co-operation between individuals and within groups of individuals more generally. The core understanding that can be gleaned from this research is the importance of reciprocity in structuring relations between individuals and developing conditions in which co-operation can emerge and remain stable. Axelrod argues that if this atmosphere of reciprocity is established, qualities like altruism and trust are not necessary between members of the group; neither do individuals have to be rational.<sup>31</sup> As long as individuals follow the rules of reciprocity, they do not even have to understand how the strategy works; the existence of reciprocity alone will ensure that co-operation can continue.<sup>32</sup> In addition, because the principle of reciprocity is self-policing in that it instantly punishes or rewards behaviour, no central authority is needed to guide group behaviour.<sup>33</sup> New members quickly learn through the clarity and consistency of the behaviour of other members following the principle; they are encouraged to co-operate once they see how alternative approaches are unproductive.<sup>34</sup>

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<sup>28</sup> Axelrod, *op. cit.*, 31.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, 110.

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*, 190.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*, 173-174.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*

## SECTION II – RESEARCH APPROACH

In the contextual discussion above, different approaches to conceptualising community and groups have been alluded to. This research intends to review these approaches, identifying their conflicting elements and evaluating what aspects need to be revised and updated to fit the demands of the modern case study. Proceeding from the assumption that groups need to be manufactured, the analysis is broken down into six areas that address key aspects of group formation:

1. What are the incentives that motivate individuals to co-operate with each other?
2. What kind of structure will best serve the group?
3. What are the common interests, values and goals that unite the members of the group?
4. Is there a need for a leadership role to be filled? And if so, who should this leader be?
5. Who is included and excluded from membership? And finally,
6. What do we call this new kind of group? How do we conceptualise it?

These questions were established through an initial review of the literature which revealed specific emphasis on these elements within a range of theoretical approaches. The scope of this project does not allow for a comprehensive review of the literature in the field of group theory. The theorists selected represent those who could be considered the most influential in the evolution of group theory, encompassing work on institutional development and organisational transformation. Their findings were appropriate for this analysis in that they considered questions of group formation and the structures which encourage groups to endure. The review of theory is synthesised to form an annotated narrative which, when applied to the case study, produces the beginnings of a framework for group formation.

## SECTION III – THEORY, FINDINGS AND APPLICATION

### Incentives for Co-operation

*Relevant theory* In his work examining the evolution of co-operation between individuals, Axelrod speaks quite generally about payoffs as being a mechanism for altering the incentives that can convince an individual to co-operate as part of a group. He suggests that the long-term incentive for co-operating must be greater than the short-term incentive for not co-operating, and that this must also take account of the degree to which individuals discount future benefits in favour of immediate gains.<sup>35</sup> The benefits that two different members might receive do not have to be directly comparable.<sup>36</sup> As long as each member personally seeks the benefit offered, to the extent that they are stimulated to co-operate with another member or the group as a whole, then the payoffs can be considered effective.<sup>37</sup> Olson speaks more specifically about mechanisms for structuring organisations and differentiates between what he calls ‘selective incentives’ and the more general benefit of the collective good that a group might be seeking to attain by co-operating with each other. While providing this collective good is the primary function of the group, and in fact, the sole reason the group is indispensable to its members, Olson argues that the group will be unlikely to encourage members to co-operate solely by delivering the collective good to each member.<sup>38</sup> In order to attract members to the group and induce them to co-operate with each other as well as to support the costs of maintaining the group, an extra, non-collective benefit will need to be offered which is tied to the collective benefit.<sup>39</sup> This extra benefit, or selective incentive, must be larger than the individual share of the group’s operational costs to be effective.<sup>40</sup> It is clear that the group will need to have an economic or social element to its structure

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<sup>35</sup> Axelrod, op. cit., 134.

<sup>36</sup> Ibid., 17.

<sup>37</sup> Ibid.

<sup>38</sup> Olson, op. cit., 15.

<sup>39</sup> Ibid., 51.

<sup>40</sup> Ibid., 134.

that generates the resources to provide these extra benefits.<sup>41</sup> Olson suggests that the group will most likely associate with some kind of private organisation which will assist in providing these resources.<sup>42</sup> Alternatively, the group could use the same skills it is employing to obtain the collective benefit to push for extra, more personalised resources for its individual members, for example, from government.<sup>43</sup>

Interest group theorists Jeffrey Berry and Clyde Wilcox suggest that ideological motivation as an incentive is far more powerful than Olson gives it credit, and can explain an individual's support for a group in the absence of Olson's selective incentives.<sup>44</sup> Similarly, Berry and Wilcox argue that the group's attainment of a collective good, and its ability to lobby government for such goods, can provide a sufficient incentive to members to contribute to the group's resources; one which Olson has underestimated in his theory of the importance of selective incentives.<sup>45</sup> Berry and Wilcox distinguish between three different kinds of incentives in order to better explain the complexity behind the membership of groups: material, purposive and solidary benefits. They suggest that group leaders or 'entrepreneurs' must consider all these aspects carefully and decide what level of each would best attract their target membership, especially given the extent of competition over membership now existing between groups in society.<sup>46</sup> Material benefits relate to tangible or economic rewards that each member might receive in exchange for their contribution. These benefits might even be donated back to the cause, but they imply a recognisable return to members that is being generated from the activities of the group. Even if these benefits are never utilised by the members, studies have shown that if members are aware of what is available to them should they need it, they can be convinced into continuing to support the group.<sup>47</sup> Purposive benefits take account of the satisfaction that an individual might get from supporting a cause or interest

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<sup>41</sup> Olson, op. cit., 134.

<sup>42</sup> Ibid.

<sup>43</sup> Ibid.

<sup>44</sup> Jeffrey M. Berry and Clyde Wilcox, *The Interest Group Society* (New York: Pearson Longman, 2009), 37.

<sup>45</sup> Ibid., 38.

<sup>46</sup> Ibid., 39.

<sup>47</sup> Ibid., 41.

that they believe in and being part of improving society for the better.<sup>48</sup> The degree to which their contribution is significant is often not important to the individual; rather, what rewards them is the knowledge that the group would not exist if all individuals took the view that their support was not critical to the group.<sup>49</sup> Finally, the solidary benefits that come from socialising with people of like minds and interests can be an additional, though not fundamental, incentive for individuals to join a group.<sup>50</sup> All these benefits can blend in a member's mind and become difficult to separate as the source of a true motive for their support of the group.<sup>51</sup> This is why it is important that group entrepreneurs consider all potential factors when designing membership incentives.

*The Auckland case* The collective good of the Auckland arts sector is the representation and influence it seeks to have in local government, specifically in the process of restructuring that is occurring in Auckland's new council. In examining the group's collective interest below, a sense of ideological motivation will be formed that might produce a purposive sense of reward for members. As has been found, the group must also develop some selective incentives in the form of material rewards in order to attract support from across the sector. It could do this by producing a publication, whether in the form of an online newsletter or hard-copy magazine, that provides information on the local arts scene exclusively to members. Staff of the organisation who have expertise in dealing with government could assist individual members of the group, who have concerns in relation to the changes occurring in local government, to make submissions and also lobby for influence in their favour. A further material benefit could include the organising of conferences and training workshops that allow the sector to share knowledge and services, as the arts sector is one in which specialisations frequently overlap. Collaboration is an element in the creative process and forms the foundation of many arts practices; greater opportunities to interact, socialise and create with each other could be a significant attraction for arts practitioners. The group could draw on this by taking a

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<sup>48</sup> Berry and Wilcox, op.cit., 42.

<sup>49</sup> Ibid., 43.

<sup>50</sup> Ibid., 44.

<sup>51</sup> Ibid., 45.

direct role in networking members who might not otherwise interact if it were not for the group.

### **Designing a Structure for Co-operation**

*Relevant theory* Organisational theorists are divided into two distinct camps which advocate for either a hierarchical or network-based structure to encourage co-operation between individuals. Both factions argue that their structural design co-ordinates individuals more efficiently than market mechanisms, which implies that there is some consensus that a level of active co-ordination is required for organisations to be effective. The key difference between these modes of structure is the level of flexibility that the structure allows; networks are the model that embraces this to a much larger extent. The flexibility of a network lies in its ability to accommodate a diverse range of member identities, as well as its ability to adapt to fast-changing environments.<sup>52</sup> Network theorist Manuel Castells defines a network as ‘a set of interconnected nodes’, emphasising the autonomous nature of the members of the group and the lack of central authority and fixed structure.<sup>53</sup> Castells argues that the flexibility of the network structure allows for continual internal readjustment, a sort of positive instability that means that relationships between members are constantly being negotiated.<sup>54</sup> The environment in which the members operate therefore evolves according to this negotiation, and its properties, such as its identity and processes, emerge over time.<sup>55</sup> Communication mechanisms are essential to the functioning of such a structure, and facilitate the ongoing interaction between its autonomous parts.<sup>56</sup> The governance of a network is characterised by the reciprocal actions of nodes as part of the process of negotiation. If a node misbehaves or fails to contribute adequately, then the network will readjust and reconstitute itself without that node.

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<sup>52</sup> Stalder, op. cit., 180.

<sup>53</sup> Ibid., 169.

<sup>54</sup> Ibid., 178.

<sup>55</sup> Ibid., 180.

<sup>56</sup> Ibid., 182.

Both hierarchical and network-based structures support the development of repeated exchange relations between members – that is, the ongoing interaction and trading of resources between them – but theories of hierarchy seek to institutionalise these to a much greater extent. By dividing the group into smaller subsections, interactions between selected members are concentrated and prolonged, thereby encouraging members to place a smaller discount on future interactions.<sup>57</sup> This is because members are able to recognise each other and remember previous exchanges, allowing for reputations to develop.<sup>58</sup> A high level of certainty and predictability is ensured, increasing the payoffs of co-operation.<sup>59</sup> The use of a central authority or leader, who arbitrates disputes between members and enforces contracts, reduces transaction costs which members would pay in a market setting.<sup>60</sup> Advocates of this theory suggest that mere communication between members is not sufficient to produce co-operation; authority is needed to force individuals to make decisions that are in their best interest, that they may not make because of the uncertainty around the actions of those they are co-ordinating with.<sup>61</sup> An authority assures both parties that the contract will be carried out, solving the problem inherent in the prisoner's dilemma which attaches a high risk to co-operation.

Is it possible to create a structure which recognises the importance of a network's flexibility, while still providing the level of certainty that a hierarchical structure offers? Any system that invests authority in certain members will alter the egalitarian dynamic inherent in a network structure. However, this equality could be restored through a rotating system of responsibility that privileges members temporarily. Members could elect out of such a system but would risk the group being 'reconstituted' in their absence; because, as Castells suggests, the importance that a node has to the network depends on its ability to contribute to the network. Consequently, 'The more a node contributes, the more importance it assumes; the

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<sup>57</sup> Axelrod, *op. cit.*, 130.

<sup>58</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>59</sup> *Ibid.*, 124.

<sup>60</sup> Gary Miller, *Managerial Dilemmas : The Political Economy of Hierarchy* (Cambridge [England]; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 11.

<sup>61</sup> *Ibid.*, 25.

less it contributes, the smaller its role in the network.’<sup>62</sup> It might be possible to connect members using a stable process of communication, which can still be reshaped when needed to account for changes in the connections. This would allow nodes to interact using established channels which are more effective than those that might be initiated independently. To develop a concentration of interaction in the network, nodes could be grouped through similar characteristics they might share relative to other nodes. Within these sub-groupings, nodes could work on a shared project which contributes to the wider goal of the network. This would encourage them to interact frequently with a select group and develop more enduring relationships. The diffusion of tasks throughout the group will mean that each sub-group has the opportunity to shape the task as they see fit and therefore influence the overall nature of processes and identity in the group according to their needs.

*The Auckland case* The Auckland arts sector is made up of a number of sub-sectors that already co-ordinate within themselves to some extent. These sub-sectors could be characterised by the nature of their practice or output; for example: music, performing arts, and visual arts; or they could be identified by their funding structure, such as those institutions which are publicly owned, commercially driven, or not-for-profit (see appendix I). The sub-groupings within the co-operation framework of this model could be built around either of these attributes, making use of whichever grouping is most appropriate to the project at hand. For example, community-run organisations might collaborate for a period to influence community funding policy, and then later work within a group of solely visual arts organisations to build a resource database suited to their requirements. In this way, relationships will develop amongst two different sets of sub-groupings, but will still promote frequent and enduring exchanges between specific sections of the membership.

A communication technology which has an inherent network structure is that of the internet. An internet-based platform for networking could be developed that is more stable than currently used communication methods like e-mail. This platform could be used to normalise relations through the mechanisms inherent in its structure. Members could set up interactive profiles which other members can access

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<sup>62</sup> Stalder, op. cit., 188-189.

and use to inform their choices when deciding whether to co-operate, based on indications of reputation that the profile provides. Facebook is an existing social network platform that operates like this to some extent. It serves as a virtual meeting space and offers several modes of communication as well as providing information about each member. This model could be adapted to support the specific purpose of the arts sector, as opposed to being purely for social interaction. There is potential to incorporate a variety of resources into such a platform that are tailored specifically to the needs of the sector: applications which assist information sharing; feedback systems which recognise contributions; and software which facilitates online meetings and project planning. Privacy can be controlled through membership limitations, and this can also serve as a mechanism for exclusion when the network needs to police itself. Membership will be discussed in more detail in the sections below.

### **A Common Interest for the Collective**

*Relevant theory* Whether belonging to the group of theory that advocates for hierarchical or network structures, the majority of theorists seem to agree that some kind of common interest, purpose, or project is required to link the members together in a meaningful and enduring way. This interest provides the basis for the values that determine how the group operates and how its members interact with each other. It offers a sense of direction to the group and a conceptual point of consensus from which members can begin all other negotiations. This notion is particularly strong in traditional community theory, which distinguishes between communities and associations based on this idea of commonality. The values of altruism, solidarity, trust and reciprocity are seen as defining true communities, as opposed to associations that are connected through purely instrumental objectives.<sup>63</sup> The requirement is that the motivations between the members be non-instrumental: free from economic concerns and competition.<sup>64</sup> Community theorist Amitai Etzioni sees a community as having a shared moral culture, a common history, identity and fate

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<sup>63</sup> Little, op. cit., 18.

<sup>64</sup> Ibid., 25.

which unite it and take precedence over any individual instrumental goals that its members may have.<sup>65</sup> Associations, by contrast, are considered to be based on a 'rationally motivated agreement' that is made between individuals with no regard to the bonds between them,<sup>66</sup> and for the purposes of furthering their respective interests.<sup>67</sup> As long as these interests continue to be satisfied, it is presumed that the association will endure.

Olson's definition of common interest would fit more closely with that of associations, as he believes that a 'harmonious, natural, unity of interest' is a mistaken idea of what unites a group.<sup>68</sup> He argues that some level of coercion, whether in the form of incentives or mandatory membership, is always needed to ensure individuals co-operate with each other.<sup>69</sup> Axelrod's theory also supports this view, suggesting that when mechanisms for co-operation like reciprocity are employed, the system will encourage individuals to co-operate without there being any measure of trust or altruism between them, or even a rational motivation for individual action.<sup>70</sup> Olson defines a common interest as a goal for the attainment of a collective good; one that an individual could not advance on their own.<sup>71</sup> Castells supports this definition, adding that not only is a common project required to orientate the group and bind its members, but a shared culture must also exist.<sup>72</sup> The values which form codes of behaviour amongst the group must be collectively understood to ensure communication between members is 'noise free': that alternate decoding of meaning is limited.<sup>73</sup> Castells also identifies 'consistency' as being an important quality that impacts on the performance of groups.<sup>74</sup> This refers to the

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<sup>65</sup> Amitai Etzioni, "Banding Together," review of *The Problems of Communitarian Politics: Unity and Conflict*, by Elizabeth Frazer, *The Times Literary Supplement*, July 14, 2000, 9.

<sup>66</sup> Max Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1947), 136.

<sup>67</sup> Little, op. cit., 123.

<sup>68</sup> Olson, op. cit., 132.

<sup>69</sup> Ibid.

<sup>70</sup> Axelrod, op. cit., 173-174.

<sup>71</sup> Olson, op. cit., 7.

<sup>72</sup> Stalder, op. cit., 189.

<sup>73</sup> Ibid.

<sup>74</sup> Ibid., 190.

level at which the collective interest is shared by its members.<sup>75</sup> If consistency is high in the group, then members will make a clear connection between the advancement of the group's interest with the advancement of their own individual goals.<sup>76</sup>

*The Auckland case* A group like the arts sector is made up of a diverse range of members, many with instrumental goals. There is competition between members at all levels: commercial firms competing in the marketplace of their industry, as well as public and community-run organisations that compete for limited funding. What does unite these members however is a sense of ideology that belongs uniquely to arts practitioners, which could be compared to a higher cause that forms a purposive motivation for supporting the group's goals. Arts practitioners of all kinds can agree that the existence of art and creativity, in the broadest sense, is fundamental to human society. This belief has a long pedigree and is expressed in terms of psychology, culture and economics throughout various studies. The sector is typically one which receives average to low wages, and therefore attracts practitioners who are passionate about their work and attach personal value to it. It is this desire to support and maintain the presence of art in society that could be said to be the common link of members of the arts sector.

In the Auckland scenario, the presence of the sector is significantly threatened through the establishment of a new council structure that has indicated reductions in funding for the sector. As inhabitants of the city and arts practitioners, individuals in the sector will be affected by changes in the urban environment, many of which may inadequately reflect the values of these individuals. This shared fate could encourage previously unconnected members to co-operate with each other. A collective goal could be established that seeks to ensure continued support for the sector and representation within local politics. This goal may produce a low level of consistency for commercial actors whose livelihood may not be threatened as much as that of public and not-for-profit sub-sectors; this is where ideology and incentives could encourage such members to identify their own goals with those of the group.

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<sup>75</sup> Stalder, op. cit., 190.

<sup>76</sup> Ibid.

In order to be effective, the culture of communication as well as specific incentives should be developed for the group by consulting with the potential membership.

### **Co-ordinating Through Leadership**

*Relevant theory* By incorporating a decentralised network structure into the framework for the group being developed, limited scope for authority is given. However, theorists such as Gary Miller have shown that leadership can be an essential element of a group's success, so some consideration must be given to this area. The leader acts as a role model and a manager, setting an example of self-denial, instilling ideals of commitment, and encouraging norms of co-operation to develop between individuals.<sup>77</sup> Miller alludes to the work of Axelrod, suggesting that while strategies of reciprocity and repeated interaction make co-operation possible, they do not make it inevitable.<sup>78</sup> On top of mechanistic incentive systems, a leader is required to create a culture of co-operation and encourage the individual to depart from their own self interest and contribute to the collective interest of the group.<sup>79</sup> The manager balances the goals of individuals with the group goals to ensure all are being met, so that individuals continue to support the group. This figure also acts as a monitor, deterring shirking and directing negotiation so that inefficiencies and costs associated with excessive bargaining are reduced.<sup>80</sup> Other theorists have discussed governance issues associated with leadership, suggesting that while efforts to have democratic decision-making processes may be made, it is often more realistic to have a leader or an executive council of members that makes decisions in a more oligarchic manner.<sup>81</sup> This is because consulting the wider group would result in inefficiencies that the group cannot afford.<sup>82</sup> The leaders are kept

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<sup>77</sup> Miller, "Managerial Dilemmas: Political Leadership in Hierarchies," op. cit., 326.

<sup>78</sup> Ibid., 347.

<sup>79</sup> Ibid.

<sup>80</sup> Miller, *Managerial Dilemmas : The Political Economy of Hierarchy*, op. cit., 37.

<sup>81</sup> Berry and Wilcox, op. cit., 55.

<sup>82</sup> Ibid.

accountable through the ability of members to ‘vote with their feet’ and leave the group if they do not approve of its decisions.<sup>83</sup>

These attributes seem to describe the role of leadership within an established community, but is a leader required to found the group and recruit its members? Theorists such as Taylor and Berry and Wilcox have identified a leadership role that they label an ‘entrepreneur’, who has an active part in the group’s formation. Taylor speaks specifically about a political entrepreneur, who works with a group that seeks support or recognition from government.<sup>84</sup> He emphasises that the entrepreneur cannot simply take on the collective goal of the group and seek to attain it through his or her own efforts, as this would merely transfer the collective action problem of the group from that goal to one of supporting the entrepreneur.<sup>85</sup> Instead, the entrepreneur assists the group in achieving its goal by helping to guide the attitudes and beliefs of the group’s members towards values that are more supportive of the goal.<sup>86</sup> Berry and Wilcox borrow their choice of the word ‘entrepreneur’ from political scientist Robert Salisbury, who likens the leader of a political group to a business actor who risks capital in starting a venture and organising resources.<sup>87</sup> They credit such leaders with a mobilising factor, which inspires support from members through a ‘sincerity of vision’.<sup>88</sup> Michael Mintrom has expanded on the theories growing around this relatively new characterisation of group leadership through his work on what he calls ‘policy entrepreneurs’. He suggests that these players can be integral in facilitating the networking of individuals with common interests, and through the unique resources that entrepreneurs have access to, can assist policy change in favour of the group’s collective interest.<sup>89</sup>

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<sup>83</sup> Berry and Wilcox, *op. cit.*, 57.

<sup>84</sup> Michael Taylor, “Cooperation and Rationality: Notes on the Collective Action Problem and Its Solutions,” in *The Limits of Rationality*, eds. Karen Schweers Cook and Margaret Levi (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), 226.

<sup>85</sup> Taylor, *op. cit.*, 233.

<sup>86</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>87</sup> Berry and Wilcox, *op. cit.*, 39.

<sup>88</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>89</sup> Michael Mintrom and Phillipa Norman, “Policy Entrepreneurship and Policy Change,” *Policy Studies Journal* 37, no. 4 (2009): 653.

*The Auckland case* If a leader is a potential resource for a group like the Auckland arts sector, how does the group then go about electing or finding such an individual? If this leader is required to initiate and mobilise the group and assist its formation, then it seems that either another authority must delegate a leader to this task, or a leader, acting as an entrepreneur, must begin this process of their own initiative. In the case of Auckland, a small group has indicated a willingness to encourage co-operation in the wider sector. The group, composed mainly of members of community-run or not-for-profit organisations, has met regularly to discuss how to co-ordinate responses of the sector to issues presented by the local government restructuring. Four members\* who raised the initial concerns and called the meetings were mandated in an informal election to pursue the interests of the group through various tasks, and take on responsibility for any decision-making required between meetings.<sup>90</sup> As most of the members of the group are also members of other organisations and have existing commitments, this method seems to be within the group's best interests; decision-making power is delegated and avoids time-consuming meetings of the whole group when decisions need to be made.

As the members of this executive group each have a history of experience within the sector and have engaged with local government in their roles as leaders of arts organisations, they are all well placed to act as entrepreneurs and pursue policy change on behalf of the wider group. While the group's leadership seeks recognition by local government of the importance of the arts, it needs to ensure that this advocacy does not privilege purely community art groups if it wishes to encourage support from the wider sector. Through the example this executive sets in giving up its time to lead the group and pursue collective ideals, other actors may be motivated to support their efforts and contribute resources. Once the group is better established and its processes more defined, this executive might be relieved of its responsibilities and a rotating system of leadership could be developed.

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\* James McCarthy, Anne Rodda, Maggie Gresson and Candy Elsmore.

<sup>90</sup> "Arts and the Auckland Supercity", public meeting held at TAPAC, Auckland, February 2, 2010.

## Setting the Boundaries of Membership

*Relevant theory* When determining a framework for co-operation, some consideration must be given to how membership will operate and what shape it will take. There are two key issues which occupy the discussion of theorists: those of size and identity. A group with wide support and a large membership will have access to greater resources, in the form of connections, information and membership dues. A large group may have more political clout by demonstrating a strong mandate from a significant section of the population. However, such groups risk becoming so large that management becomes difficult and administration resources become strained.<sup>91</sup> Members may also feel a declining sense of efficacy as the group grows, meaning contributions are reduced; especially since a lack of contribution becomes less apparent and is more difficult to monitor as size increases.<sup>92</sup> The idea of membership identity relates to the criticism of insularity that theorists have attributed to strongly exclusive communities. An insular group with a stable and exclusive membership risks isolating itself from the rest of society, discouraging newcomers and thus precluding the innovation and evaluation that ensures the survival of the group.<sup>93</sup> Such an approach also fails to recognise the complexity of its members, who as individuals ground their identity in a variety of collectives which represent their interests.<sup>94</sup>

This risk of segregated cohesiveness that is associated with communities may be mitigated by the use of a more flexible structure like a network. Networks incorporate the 'strength of weak ties' by allowing for associations to develop between people without locking them in to a rigid arrangement which seeks to define the identity of its components.<sup>95</sup> However, a level of exclusivity is still necessary to provide the group with a mechanism for self-policing. Some barriers to entry are required in order to offer the selective incentives only to those who contribute to the group. This barrier can be as simple as requesting a contribution to maintain the

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<sup>91</sup> Berry and Wilcox, *op. cit.*, 159.

<sup>92</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>93</sup> Florida, *op. cit.*, 6.

<sup>94</sup> Stalder, *op. cit.*, 179.

<sup>95</sup> Mark S. Granovetter, "The Strength of Weak Ties," *The American Journal of Sociology* 78, no. 6 (1973): 1360.

group's running costs, rather than criteria which preferences some types of members over others. There is, however, one type of criteria which could limit the size of the group in a functional way – rather than allowing individual members to join, the group could be an association of organisations, through which individuals participate via their pre-existing alliances to other groups. This would be an effective way to ensure membership numbers remain manageable and would also avoid replicating the organising efforts that already exist within the sector.

*The Auckland case* As mentioned above, the executive decision-makers of the current arts sector group in Auckland are themselves leaders of existing arts organisations. Representatives from other organisations form the wider group, which this executive consults, and this seems to be an effective way of co-ordinating action. Across the sub-sectors that make up the wider arts sector in Auckland, a variety of organisations have been formed that represent the collective interests of their individuals. These organisations have pooled resources and created systems for interaction and communication among their memberships. What is lacking is a broader umbrella organisation that links these smaller groups together and can be said to represent the arts sector as a whole. Such an organisation will need to have minimal barriers to entry as it must be as comprehensive as possible in order to have the political significance it seeks. It will need to allow for a broad definition of what constitutes an arts organisation to avoid developing insular characteristics and unfairly limiting membership. In keeping with the theory of network structures, this definition should be a matter of self-identification, as is fitting with the idea of autonomous nodes. Only if a member begins to make a negative contribution to the group, or becomes a free-rider, should the group make use of its exclusive abilities and expel the member.

### **An Advocacy Coalition for the Auckland Arts Sector**

*Relevant theory* As the traditional group structures of community, hierarchy, and networks have been theoretically modified to suit the requirements of this new context, a new name needs to be selected to describe the group framework initiated by this research. Olson's work discusses organisations, which is a concept he closely

links with the design of firms. The work of Berry and Wilcox, on the other hand, speaks of interest groups, which are so called for the way they co-ordinate individuals around an interest or cause, which is linked to their main activity, that of lobbying government.<sup>96</sup> Within their discussion of interest groups, Berry and Wilcox refer to the slightly different, but related, structure of an issue network. This is a group formed from a collection of interest groups and other related organisations in a policy area that have a particular cause in common at a certain time.<sup>97</sup> Berry and Wilcox expand on their discussion of issue networks by referring to coalitions as being a similar type of organisation involving interest groups as well as political actors. Such coalitions are developed with the explicit aim of showing the level of support behind a particular issue, in order to give it credibility and to summon decision-makers' attention to it.<sup>98</sup> Berry and Wilcox suggest that this type of group is one which tends to have a more ad hoc existence; coming together as part of an advocacy campaign for a particular issue and dissolving once its objectives have been met.<sup>99</sup> It appears that these attributes are not immutable however; they allow that some coalitions have the potential to be enduring organisations to which groups commit and contribute resources indefinitely.<sup>100</sup>

The concept of coalitions (outside of its use to describe government alliances) has received some attention by political theorists, but is still sufficiently ambiguous to be amenable to further definition. Paul Sabatier, who is credited with developing the concept of an advocacy coalition, argues that the more ad hoc coalition arrangements are unlikely to have any enduring influence on policy change. He therefore does not consider them as being part of his model of an advocacy coalition.<sup>101</sup> Sabatier emphasises the importance of shared beliefs – such as values, causal assumptions and problem perceptions – between members of the coalition in holding the coalition together for the time required to make the desired impact on

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<sup>96</sup> Berry and Wilcox, *op. cit.*, 5.

<sup>97</sup> *Ibid.*, 171.

<sup>98</sup> *Ibid.*, 157.

<sup>99</sup> *Ibid.*, 159.

<sup>100</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>101</sup> Paul Sabatier, "An advocacy coalition framework of policy change and the role of policy-oriented learning therein," *Policy Sciences* 21 (1988): 139.

policy direction.<sup>102</sup> These beliefs unite a potentially diverse range of members around a policy issue and, together with a certain degree of co-ordinated activity over time, allow the group to ‘translate their shared beliefs into public policies or programs’.<sup>103</sup> Sabatier’s definition combines the element of a shared goal through its use of the word ‘advocacy’, with a sense of institutional organisation in the word ‘coalition’. Dictionaries vary in their definition of ‘coalition’, but seem to agree on the sense of its being an alliance of groups rather than purely individuals. This definition pays respect to potential political aims of the group without the connotations attached to interest groups as being centrally motivated around participating in the political process through lobbying. The impermanence associated with coalitions may effectively encapsulate the flexibility inherent in a network structure, but at the same time, does not have to produce a sense of inevitable disbandment.

*The Auckland case* This research proposes an advocacy coalition for the Auckland arts sector, which embodies an agreement among Auckland’s art institutions to co-operate with each other to further the interests of the arts within the city. The sector forms this coalition primarily to indicate to the city and local government, the level of its connectedness and its ability to work towards goals collectively. The breadth of support it can summon through this organisation will provide a powerful signal of its potential political weight. By increasing its networks, the arts sector identifies itself as a unit within the city’s structure, rather than an area of disparate actors with competing goals. These networks can be used by policy-makers to engage more effectively with the actors affected by changes to the city’s government structure. If the coalition can establish systems that are approved by its members, it can continue to have relevance after the changes to government occur, and therefore continue to participate in the political process. Not only will these networks provide a way to engage with politics, but they will offer the sector ongoing avenues for sharing information and resources to encourage growth in all areas of the sector.

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<sup>102</sup> Sabatier, op. cit., 139.

<sup>103</sup> Ibid.

## SECTION IV – DISCUSSION

### Implications for Theory

This development of an advocacy coalition framework has implications for theories of democracy and the role of government in the political and private lives of individuals. In his work on the changing nature of civil society, Robert Dahl points to the increasing complexity of political processes brought about through larger quantities of information being made by developments in communication technology.<sup>104</sup> He assigns responsibility to the state to ensure that individuals keep up with these increasing levels and continue to understand and be engaged with the political process.<sup>105</sup> Dahl credits groups as being an effective vehicle for this function of civic education; by filtering information according to the particular interests of their members and communicating it in a relevant language, they may even incite action amongst their membership.<sup>106</sup> In this way, the role of education flows into a role of promoting participation. Again, groups can fulfil this more effectively than the state by allowing for a sphere of deliberation that is independent from state influence and where specific interest-related agendas can be developed. These groups can organise action on interests and lobby for causes; allowing avenues for greater citizen participation in the ongoing process of governance, beyond the mere act of voting. Finally, the recognition of groups as ‘the most basic political form’ leads to the acknowledgement of their role in the representation of individuals’ interests in government.<sup>107</sup> This is embodied in the idea of associational democracy, which sees groups as a channel of access between government and citizens that allows them to communicate their expectations and to link up their goals.<sup>108</sup> Groups also ensure that government is representative by monitoring its actions and drawing attention to areas of concern for citizens. Because government action is often incremental over long periods of time, organisation is needed amongst

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<sup>104</sup> Robert Dahl, *On Democracy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), 187.

<sup>105</sup> Ibid.

<sup>106</sup> Dahl, op. cit., 185.

<sup>107</sup> Olson, op. cit., 117.

<sup>108</sup> Berry and Wilcox, op. cit., 7.

citizens to ensure that this monitoring is an ongoing presence which maintains constant accountability.<sup>109</sup>

While groups have a role in carrying out these functions of democracy, government has a reciprocal role to play in supporting the capacity of groups to carrying out these functions. The interplay between the two fits a model that is finding increasing currency in an innovative form of government structure, that of collaborative governance. If the importance of groups to democracy as outlined above is accepted, then this necessitates an increasingly decentralised approach to governance, with power being devolved downwards to communities. This devolution cannot be done irresponsibly and does not have to be towards a goal of absolute decentralisation.<sup>110</sup> Rather, the government must implement careful planning to increase the capacity of groups, and design the conditions which support the flourishing of pluralism.<sup>111</sup> As Keane has said, ‘A more democratic order cannot occur without state power.’<sup>112</sup> Government thus has an important role to play in designing social and economic institutions that allow communities to operate effectively. This relates closely to Axelrod’s work, which identifies the conditions or institutional environment as being fundamental to a group’s success. Once these conditions are established, government has an ongoing role as an arbiter of the conflicts which arise between different groups, ensuring that debate occurs within a neutral framework that allows all voices to be heard. Similarly, government must ensure that access to this public arena is equal, and citizens are not limited in their efforts to organise by a lack of resources or skills.

Theories of social capital link the growth and support of connections between individuals with economic growth and prosperity.<sup>113</sup> The work of Robert Putnam and Fukuyama has shown that ‘unbridled individualism’ creates inefficiencies in a

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<sup>109</sup> Dahl, op. cit., 186.

<sup>110</sup> Little, op. cit., 25.

<sup>111</sup> Ibid.

<sup>112</sup> John Keane, *Democracy and Civil Society: On the Predicaments of European Socialism, the Prospects for Democracy, and the Problem of Controlling Social and Political Power* (London; New York: Verso, 1988), 23.

<sup>113</sup> Francis Fukuyama, *The Great Disruption: Human Nature and the Reconstitution of Social Order* (New York: Free Press, 1999), 14.

capitalist economy that can be overcome through greater co-ordination and trust building.<sup>114</sup> The term ‘capital’ refers to the economic value that this approach offers to society and its inhabitants. Putnam also connects social capital with civic engagement, pointing to studies that show the importance of social capital for civic learning and skill building.<sup>115</sup> He sees it as a fundamental aspect of a deliberative democracy, on which the performance of democratic institutions heavily depends.<sup>116</sup> Community theorists, such as those reviewed by Little, advocate against adopting a social capital argument as the basis for the support of groups. This is because such an argument provides an economic justification for an activity (that of community building) which they believe has an innate worth of its own, and should not be associated with instrumental principles.<sup>117</sup> While such a position should be acknowledged, an economic argument could still be considered, if only as one of the many arguments in favour of community development. The social capital argument has use in that it is delivered in a language that has currency with planners and policy-makers. It is a rationale behind much of urban planning, and policy documents increasingly cite its logic to push an agenda for community support, particularly in arts and cultural planning.

### **Practical Implications**

While it is the role of government to support the democratic ideals of representation, participation and civic education, government also stands to benefit practically from embracing a collaborative governance approach. Functions of government can be shared with groups, removing some pressure from government resources. Groups involved in the decision-making process relieve government decision-makers of a level of responsibility. Groups can develop their own resources and banks of information, and even develop independent policy based on this work, which could inform government action in their specific field. Groups can contract some of the

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<sup>114</sup> Little, op. cit., 102.

<sup>115</sup> Robert D. Putnam, *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community* (London: Simon & Schuster, 2001), 339.

<sup>116</sup> *Ibid.*, 349.

<sup>117</sup> Little, op. cit., 83.

burden of implementation, which may also improve the effectiveness of programmes and reduce the need for their revision. In assisting the development of an advocacy coalition for the Auckland arts sector, local government will have an organised body of local citizens, businesses and organisations that can readily be consulted in the development of policy. In the forming of the new region-wide council, new strategies will need to be developed in all areas, which will place heavy demands on council policy-makers. The Auckland arts advocacy coalition could collaborate with local government to produce a regional arts strategy for Auckland city which is representative of the sector's needs, and meets the democratic requirements for government to consult effectively with those affected by its actions. A smaller advisory group could be selected from the coalition that provides ongoing monitoring of local government, and ensures that the objectives developed in the arts strategy are being fulfilled appropriately.

### **Implications for Research**

A final factor which cannot go unmentioned is the role of telecommunication technology in the development of communities. Throughout the Auckland case study, this research has identified tools of communication technology as part of the solution to problems of collective action. Castells refers to technology frequently throughout his own research, and connects it very closely with network concepts. He credits it with 'framing the relationships of experience' – in other words, having an influential role in shaping social values and determining how people engage with certain social phenomena.<sup>118</sup> Castells goes further, to connect this process with the renewing of the institutions of governance on a wider scale, and facilitating the development of non-political organisation at an unprecedented level of complexity.<sup>119</sup> Facebook has been identified as an empirical example of an online platform that fits the network attributes described by Castells. The Facebook model could be an area of further research. This should address how the findings of this research could enhance its mechanisms of communication, and provide a practical guide to carrying out the model. Berry and Wilcox have identified the internet as a

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<sup>118</sup> Stalder, op. cit., 27.

<sup>119</sup> Ibid., 185-186.

resource for the development of selective incentives to reward the members of a community. As has been noted, these resources will need to be personalised to fit the demands of the target group, the Auckland arts sector, which will involve further consultation with this group. Finally, urban planners have recognised the potential of the internet as a mechanism of engagement with citizens, with new roles emerging which see planners as webmasters and data managers, facilitating online interaction and monitoring networks.<sup>120</sup> This is a relatively unexplored area; if community models evolve to incorporate greater dependence on technology, planning models will need to take account of this in order to remain relevant.

Government engagement with models for co-operation, such as the one developed in this research, is important as it will ensure that groups of individuals wishing to organise will not be disadvantaged by their lack of expertise or resources. If this model was developed further and incorporated into policy processes, it could be a ready tool for organisation. It should be noted that the research assumes that the development of a system for co-operation will actually benefit the sector in question, and help them to achieve greater influence in the policy-making process than if they were to act as individual organisations. Until the recommendations arising from the findings have been carried out and the model implemented, it would be hard to prove that this is not the case. Once the implementation of the framework has occurred, further research could evaluate the impact this has on the sector's engagement with local government and its policy-making processes. This research was phrased as 'initiating a framework' for co-operation to emphasise the need for further work to be conducted. It sought to identify a gap in theory – specifically, concerning emerging forms of governance that extended past the scope of existing theoretical models. The model developed in this research does not claim to be complete, as a sufficient level of community participation has not occurred to guide its development. To build a truly comprehensive model and meet the needs identified in this research, further work must involve a wide range of members from the target community, and incorporate their input at a fundamental level that meets the standards of collaborative governance.

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<sup>120</sup> Scott Campbell and Susan S. Fainstein, eds., "The Structure and Debates of Planning Theory," in *Readings in Planning Theory* (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 2003), 11.

## SECTION V – CONCLUSION

An advocacy coalition framework has been developed which borrowed from a variety of, sometimes incompatible, approaches to group formation and organisation. This framework looked at aspects such as incentives for co-operation, group structure, common interests, leadership, membership and labels. It found that a complex combination of incentives motivated individuals to support groups, so group design needed to recognise this complexity in order to be effective. Hierarchical and network-based structures were compared and contrasted, producing findings which favoured a network approach for its flexibility, but nevertheless, included more stable forms of interaction to ensure members' relations and exchanges would occur in an environment of certainty. The examination of structural elements of the group raised questions of the role of leadership in the framework. Network structures avoided any sense of authority, but hierarchical theories made a strong argument for some level of management and source of direction to guide members. These two positions were reconciled by allowing for the role of an entrepreneur, or group of decision-makers, who provide the impetus for the group to form, but hold only a temporary influence on its ongoing operation through a rotating system of leadership. Discussion of membership was related to incentives – as limits placed on membership could be used to exclude members who failed to contribute to the group's efforts. Findings indicated that this membership needed to remain otherwise open, in terms of member attributes, in order to avoid the stagnancy of insularity. Members were thus able to self-identify as belonging to the group, as long as they fit the one characteristic of being an organisation (as opposed to an individual practitioner).

Finally, the choice of advocacy coalition as the name for the model framework developed, hoped to be sufficiently free of connotations from previous theories of group formation. It was selected for its distinctiveness from purely politically-motivated organisations like interest groups, and for its indication of progression from broader and more conventional terms like community. An advocacy coalition embodies qualities from both of these concepts, but it seeks to define a collective that not only has goals of political influence, but also holds an

intrinsic sense of identity and purpose in its togetherness. This research applied the framework to the case of the Auckland arts sector to see the how specific elements required by the sector might modify it. The level of detail was constrained by the need to do further work that actively involves the sector in the development of a framework that services its needs. These findings could be applied to other sectors in with similar characteristics to the case study. As has been shown, the greater such a framework for co-operation is adopted in society, the better will its democratic institutions fare. With levels of information rising and governance structures changing – introducing a new depth of complexity to the political process – at no time has it been more important than the present to implement new ways to engage citizens.

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# Appendix I