A self-management catchment approach entails farmers in an individual catchment bearing the responsibility for restoring water quality and mitigating further degradation. The logic of this approach is that each catchment is unique and operates as an interlinked body of water.[1] Therefore those who indirectly and directly discharge contaminants into the catchment should be held collectively responsible for their actions. Self-management would be coupled with penalties for non-compliance. These penalties should take the form of monetary fines and must be set at a level which encourages action. If the penalties are too low then there may not be sufficient incentive for some farmers to adopt mitigation measures and instead they may opt to simply pay the fine. The imposition of penalties must take into account the fact that there may be minimal improvement for some time because of the time lags between when nutrients are placed onto soil, when they contaminate the water body and when the benefits will be realised.[2]
Effectiveness
Under a self-management approach the degree, extent and rate at which mitigation measures are adopted will be determined by the state of the water quality in the particular catchment and the willingness of the farmers to respond to the problem. If the monetary penalties for non-compliance are high enough then there should be a strong incentive to take immediate action and adopt extensive mitigation measures. There is also likely to be ‘peer pressure’ among the farmers within a catchment to adopt certain measures. Overall, it is likely that the self-management approach would be highly effective.
Equity
A self-management policy response may not be equitable as it could result in some members of the farming catchment ‘free-riding’ and neglecting to contribute to mitigation measures. It also may be inequitable because some of the more responsible members of the farming catchment may not have caused the degraded water quality but are now obligated to repair their neighbour’s problem. This concern is amplified when it is appreciated that there will be farmers who have recently purchased a farm in a catchment with poor water quality. It seems unfair that they must bear the burden and associated cost of improving the water quality in the catchment. Due to these factors a self-management policy is rated poor in terms of equity.
Costs
Self-management involves relatively minimal cost. It would require farmers to devote some time to meeting with others from the catchment. It would also require monitoring of water quality in the catchment. Yet this should not be any more extensive than current monitoring levels undertaken by Regional Council and so does not require additional resources. There would also be some costs associated with imposing monetary fines for non-compliance.
Externalities and Risks
One externality which may result from the self-management policy response is that there could be a reduction in the value of farms in catchments where there is poor water quality. This relates to issues of equity as it is conceivable that there will be situations where this will result in unfair outcomes. Yet this risk should not be overstated as all farmers will have to implement some mitigation measures presumably for the same cost. The extent to which the relevant water body is degraded will possibly impact on the number of mitigation measures required and how quickly these must be adopted to avoid the imposition of penalties.