Interest Group definitions were analysed using modified comparative institutional analysis. Comparative analysis assumes that ‘effective policy responses to current problems are most likely to be struck on when policy design is closely informed by knowledge of actual working policy settings found elsewhere’ (Mintrom 2010: 242).
For each country compared, academic literature concerning interest group definition was reviewed, the context of interest group regulation is discussed, the text of definitions was isolated, and the elements of the text compared to the framework developed from the academic sources. The legislative text of the definitions can found in the data seection of this website.
The countries selected for comparison are Australia, USA, Canada, Germany and the United Kingdom.
These countries were selected because (apart from Germany) they legislate in a common language, are institutionally and culturally similar and often make policy within similar knowledge paradigms. Germany was included to provide a corporatist contrast, and as a check on any cultural assumptions of the academic derived framework.
An additional consideration was the availability of recent academic material concerning interest group regulation in these countries in the form of refereed academic journal articles, and government commissioned reports.
It should be noted that New Zealand has an unusually concentrated system of political power and that the activities of interest groups is likely to reflect this institutional difference.
Table 3: Summary of Institutional Differences
| Country | Institutional Settings | |||
| Chambers | Structure | Electoral System | System | |
| New Zealand | Unicameral | Unitary | Proportional | Westminister |
| Australia | Bicameral | Federal | Majoritarian | Westminister |
| USA | Bicameral | Federal | Majoritarian | Republic |
| Canada | Bicameral | Federal | Majoritarian | Westminister |
| Germany | Bicameral | Federal | Proportional | Republic |
| UK | Bicameral | Unitary | Majoritarian | Westminister |
Comparing institutional differences within a framework drawn from academic accounts is a complicated but valid approach to the definition of interest groups.
By conceiving the political world in terms of interests, lobby groups and interest groups are revealed as only one form that interests take. From this broader perspective, any definition of interest groups should be co-operative with the regulation of these other forms of interests within the same political system.
By first establishing an ideational frame for interest group definition, cooperative regulation of interests can be developed and a fragmented and partial approach avoided.
